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Plaintiff/Appellee, ] 
vs. ] 
KEITH B. ROMNEY, individually ] 
and d/b/a KEITH B. ROMNEY & ] 
ASSOCIATES, ] 
Defendant/Appellant. ] 
l REPLY BRIEF OF THE APPELLANT 
> Appeal No. 9303by-CA 
Appellant Keith B. Romney ("Romney") respectfully submits the 
following reply brief to the brief of Appellee Brent A. Ferrin 
("Ferrin"): 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES 
-Utah R. Evid. 103(a)(2) provides as follows: 
(a) Effect of erroneous ruling. Error may not be 
predicated upon a ruling which admits or excludes 
evidence unless a substantial right of the party is 
affected, and 
1e -k -k 
(2) Offer of proof. In case the ruling is one 
excluding evidence, the substance of the evidence 
was made known to the court by offer or was apparent 
from the context within which the questions were 
asked. 
-Utah R. Evid. 401 provides as follows: 
"Relevant evidence" means evidence having any 
tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of 
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consequence to the determination of the action more 
probable or less probable than it would be without the 
evidence. 
-Utah R. Evid. 402 provides as follows: 
All relevant evidence is admissible, except as 
otherwise provided by the Constitution of the United 
States or the Constitution of the state of Utah, statute, 
or by these rules, or by other rules applicable in courts 
of this state. Evidence which is not relevant is not 
admissible. 
-Utah R. Evid. 403 provides as follows: 
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its 
probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger 
of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or 
misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, 
waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative 
evidence. 
-Utah Code Ann. 21-5-4(2) (1992) provides as follows: 
(2) A witness attending from outside the state in 
a civil case is allowed mileage at the rate of 25 cents 
per mile and is taxed for the distance actually and 
necessarily traveled inside the state in going only. 
THE ARGUMENT 
BECAUSE THE DETERMINATION OF WHETHER EVIDENCE 
IS RELEVANT AND THEREFORE ADMISSIBLE IS A 
QUESTION OF LAW, THE CORRECT STANDARD OF 
APPELLATE REVIEW IN THIS CASE IS A CORRECTNESS 
STANDARD 
The determination of whether evidence is relevant and 
therefore admissible involves a question of law, which means that 
such determination is subject to review for correctness on appeal. 
State v. Gonzalez, 822 P.2d 1214, 1216 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). In 
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his brief, however, Ferrin contends that r trial court's 
determination or- ? h^ exclusion ^utisslb ! ' tv * evidence is 
Ferrin of this position that he asserts the issue "is not: subject 
to debate." 
The fact is, the issue still appears to be at least "subject 
debate," . * ..-r actually ^lear tiut* ' .i* more expansive 
•: : i e c tiness «r*::Ci' ^x -<- 3 In State v. 
rhurman, 846 P. 2d .2*' • Ulan X.I^I*> utie Supreme Court conceded that 
its earlier Qt ^t A^ent of th^ i-".v <n State v. Ramirez. 817 P.2d 774 
quest: :n ox . 3-\ JL _ - .* A .< eview que . :n ; aw s*r ier /r 
correctness standard, f Ramirez r n.^# war; li"1"1 not 
correct, even if the correctness «.._._.:. - •« app. . , only . .he 
trial court's ultimate conclusion to admit or exclude the proffered 
iT
 ^* ::e " Thurman a 1. 
Notwithstanding that "conecLiOii, ' numerous Utah cases decided 
since the Thurman case have repeated the t-oregodng statement of the 
' " Ramirez Set; : La:e v . 
Martinez, 848 P.2d 702, -,-4 , Jtah . - I-.^ 3) Whether 
testimony is admissih P IS a question cf aw, .*;hi^ h we review under 
c: : o. t: t: e ' ,•-.:• SiaLc v. o^o 
(Utah Ct '99* • :.• * ne: testimony - admissible is a 
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question of law, which we review under a correctness standard . • 
. " ) ; State v. Diaz, 859 P. 2d 19 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) ("Whether 
evidence is admissible is a question of law, which we review for 
correctness . . . " ). 
Perhaps the reason why this statement of the law lives on 
despite the apparently clear language in Thurman is because of what 
the Thurman Court went on to state in connection with the 
"correction" of its earlier statement of the law in Ramirez. In 
Thurman, the Supreme Court further stated: 
. . . the most common standards of review, clear error 
for findings of fact, abuse of discretion or reasonability for 
rulings requiring a balancing of factors, and correctness for 
conclusions of law, can each be viewed as granting 
progressively less discretion to the trial judge and placing 
more responsibility on the appellate court . . . Taken 
collectively, all such standards are law, and whether a trial 
judge has exceeded the scope of the discretion granted to him 
or her is a legal question. To the foregoing extent, then, 
the statement in [footnote 3 of] Ramirez that admissibility 
is always a question of law is correct. But the rest of the 
statement — that such a correctness standard is to be applied 
in reviewing each such ruling -- is not. Thurman, supra, at 
p. 1270, n.ll. 
That footnote 3 of Ramirez is still good law in the eyes of 
the Utah Supreme Court, notwithstanding Thurman, is evidenced by 
its recent decision in Crookston v. Fire Insurance Exchange, 1993 
WL 408287 (Utah 1993), where the Court cites both footnote 3 of 
Ramirez and footnote 11 of Thurman in the same sentence for the 
proposition that the determination of whether to grant a new trial 
is a "legal decision" which is reviewed under a correctness 
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standard. Crookston at p. 1. The key question is apparently 
whether the ruling in question was "one determining the facts to 
which the law will be applied [or one] applying the law to the 
determined facts." State v. LeVasseur, 854 P.2d 1022, 1024 (Utah 
Ct. App., 1993). If the disputed ruling is one involving the 
application of the law to the facts, then a correctness standard 
will apply. LeVasseur at p. 1024. 
And that is precisely what this case presents. Romney 
contends that the trial court incorrectly applied the law (Utah R. 
Evid. 401) to the facts when it concluded that Romney !s Exhibits 
57 and 58 were not relevant and therefore excluded them from 
evidence. Utah R. Evid. 401 should not normally be difficult for 
a party to satisfy. It merely requires that proffered evidence 
have "any tendency" to make a key fact "more probable or less 
probable than it would be without the evidence." If a document is 
relevant, it is admissible. Utah R. Evid. 402. Once that 
relevancy determination is made, then Utah R. Evid. 403 applies 
which vests the trial court with considerable discretion. However, 
the underlying determination of relevance must first be made before 
the trial court can even begin to exercise the discretion allowed 
by Rule 403. Accordingly, that initial relevancy determination is 
subject to a correctness standard of review on appeal. 
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There are strong policy reasons supporting that conclusion. 
When a trial court makes a relevancy ruling, it is essentially 
usurping the role of the jury and substituting its own judgment for 
that of the jury. By deeming proffered evidence to be not 
relevant, a trial court prevents a jury from considering the 
proffered evidence at all. The excluded evidence does not even 
enter into the equation when the jury retires to deliberate. 
Utah R. Evid. 402 states the fundamental rule that "[a] 11 
relevant is admissible," except as limited as stated in the Rule. 
So basic, so fundamental, is this presumption favoring the 
admissibility of relevant evidence that relevant evidence may only 
be excluded if its probative value is "substantially outweighed by 
the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or 
misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of 
time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence." Utah R. 
Evid. 403. If a trial court can only exclude admittedly relevant 
evidence if its probative value is "substantially outweighed" by 
other factors, it stands to reason that a trial court's initial 
determination of whether evidence is relevant at all is a much 
narrower question, which should be reviewed far more carefully on 
appeal. Hence, the application of the correctness standard of 
review for such determinations. For all of the foregoing reasons, 
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Romney urges the Court to employ a correctness standard of review 
in deciding this appeal. 
II. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT EXCLUDED 
ROMNEY'S EXHIBITS 57 AND 58 FROM EVIDENCE 
The trial court clearly erred when it deemed Romney1s exhibits 
57 & 58 to be not relevant and excluded them from evidence. In his 
brief, Ferrin contends that there is no "exact definition" of 
relevance. That is incorrect. There is an exact definition of 
relevance and it is as follows: 
"Relevant evidence" means evidence having any tendency 
to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to 
the determination of the action more probable or less probable 
than it would be without the evidence. Utah R. Evid. 401. 
Ferrin concedes the definition is "broad," and indeed it is. 
Proffered evidence must merely have some "tendency" to make an 
important fact "more probable or less probable than it would be 
without the evidence." Romney's exhibits 57 and 58 clearly 
satisfied this test. 
Ferrin contends that they did not satisfy the test because 
"the documents did not deal with any issue before the trial court" 
since they related to Ferrin's prior attempts to purchase Keith 
Romney Associates ("KRA") from Romney, and not to the issue of 
compensation. The documents themselves plainly refute that 
assertion. Romney!s exhibit 58 contains the following key language 
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regarding compensation under the title "Purchase Option and 
Employment Agreement:" 
[Romney] and [Ferrin] agree to the following re: Employment 
Agreement of [Ferrin]: 
1* Until [Ferrin] purchases KRA or is terminated/ [Romney] 
agrees to pay [Ferrin] an amount equal to twenty-five percent (25%) 
of all income received by KRA less any unreimbursed business 
cultivation expenses (the same method of determination used to 
date). (Romney's Exhibit 58, emphasis added). 
Romney!s exhibit 57, in Ferrin's own handwriting, also 
provided the following with respect to compensation: 
7) [Romney] will be compensated for his actions as an 
associate of KRA by receiving 20% of the income to KRA 
net of [business cultivation] expenses. Plus he will 
receive bonuses based on exceptional performance. If 
[Romney] leaves KRA on his own or is terminated the above 
mentioned 20% payments shall cease. (Romneyfs Exhibit 
57, paragraph 7, emphasis added). 
While each of the foregoing documents, in other sections, 
contain some information not relevant to the case, such as what was 
to become of KRA furniture and so on, each of them obviously do 
contain provisions crucially important and relevant to Romney's 
defense of Ferrin!s action, which was for unpaid compensation 
pursuant to an "oral agreement" that Ferrin supposedly had with 
Romney that Ferrin would still be entitled to be paid by KRA even 
if he were to quit KRA. 
Ferrin further contends that Romney never "alleg[ed] or 
proffer[ed] that during the negotiations for sale of the business 
the issue of the compensation of [Ferrin] arose." In the first 
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place, that assertion is false. See, e.g., Transcript, Day 2, pp. 
83 and 86. Secondly, it was plainly evident from the key portions 
of the documents proffered and read to the court that they dealt 
with "the issue of compensation," so it is immaterial in any event 
whether Romney also alleged or proffered that they did. 
Romneyfs sole purpose in offering these documents was to use 
these buy-out documents in connection with his defense -- that the 
oral compensation "agreement" alleged by Ferrin did not exist, that 
Romney never agreed to it, nor would he agree to it, and that if 
the tables were turned and Ferrin were the employer, even Ferrin 
himself would not agree to what he was alleging Romney in essence 
agreed to. Not only that, in the case of exhibit 58, there was an 
actual representation by Ferrin, an admission of a party, through 
his attorney who drafted the document, of what the compensation 
agreement had been "to date," (just a few months prior to the date 
Ferrin quit KRA), which was completely consistent with Romney1s 
position at trial and directly contrary to Ferrin!s trial 
testimony. 
There can be no doubt that these documents (or at least the 
quoted portions thereof) were "relevant." They certainly had a 
"tendency" to make the sole and key "fact of consequence to the 
determination of the action [i.e., the existence of the alleged 
oral agreement] more probable or less probable . . . " The fact 
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that the proposed buyout, the context in which these documents 
arose, was never consummated is of no consequence to their 
relevance to this action. The key provisions of these documents 
are essentially statements against interest, even admissions on the 
part of Ferrin. Ferrin's recitation of "facts" supporting the 
"irrelevancy" of these documents go to the weight the jury might 
have afforded these documents, not their admissibility. The 
documents were plainly relevant and therefore admissible, and the 
trial court erred and misapplied Utah R. Evid. 401 in concluding 
otherwise. 
III. 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT RULE ON THE BASIS OF 
UTAH R, EVID. 403 AND THEREFORE RULE 403 IS 
INAPPLICABLE TO ANY ISSUES RAISED BY THIS APPEAL 
In his brief, Ferrin next engages in some speculation about 
what the trial court may have done had it found the subject 
documents to be relevant. The trial court never reached that 
point. Utah R. Evid. 403 deals with the exclusion of relevant 
evidence. The trial court never found the subject documents to be 
relevant. Utah R. Evid. 403 was not considered by the trial court 
nor addressed by either of the parties at trial. The inquiry never 

















OUTCOME OF THE TRIAL 
The trial court's error in excluding Romney!s Exhibits 57 and 
58 from being admitted into evidence prejudiced Romney and 
constitutes reversible error. Without question, there is "a 
reasonable likelihood" that the trial court's erroneous 
determination affected the outcome of the proceedings. Ferrin 
contends that is not so, and in support thereof repeats the same 
arguments he has already made concerning the fact that the proposed 
buyout was never completed, etc., which objections merely go to the 
weight of the evvidence, not their admissibility. 
The single most important question considered by the jury --
Did or would Romney ever agree to pay Ferrin as Ferrin alleges? -
- was addressed directly by these two documents. The trial court's 
refusal to allow these documents into evidence destroyed Romney's 
ability to defend himself from the allegations made by Ferrin and 
to prove his case to the jury. 
The fact is, these two documents, outside of Romney's own 
testimony, comprised the only evidence Romney had to defend himself 
from Ferrin's allegation that Romney had "agreed" to pay him a 
share of income received by KRA, even if Ferrin were to voluntarily 
quit KRA, as long as such income was "earned" by KRA before Ferrin 
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left. Other than his own testimony, Romney did not have anything 
else to defend himself with. The trial court absolutely 
eviscerated Romney!s defense by refusing to admit these two 
documents into evidence. 
Picture it. The jury was presented with evidence that Romney 
had received several hundred thousand dollars in income after 
Ferrin quit KRA, that this money had supposedly been "earned" by 
KRA before Ferrin voluntarily quit (which Romney denied, but it 
fell on deaf ears), and here was Ferrin who argued in effect that 
really as a matter of simple "fairness," and an implied oral 
"agreement," he ought to receive a share of it since it had been 
"earned" by KRA before he left. 
What the jury did not see or hear was that, as evidenced by 
Romneyfs exhibit 58, in Ferrin's own words through his attorney, 
the "method of determination [of Ferrin1s compensation] used to 
date [the "date" being just two months prior to Ferrin's 
departure!]" was completely different than what Ferrin was now 
alleging at trial. Contrary to what Ferrin alleged, the "method 
of determination" was not based on whether KRA had "earned" any 
income. Rather, the true agreement was: "[u]ntil [Ferrin] . . . 
is terminated, [Romney] agrees to pay [Ferrin] an amount equal to 
twenty-five percent (25%) of all income received [not "earned"] by 
KRA . . ." What is so remarkable and powerful about this 
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documentary evidence is that it was generated by Ferrin, not 
Romney, yet it would have completely supported and proved Romney's 
testimony at trial! 
Not only that, the jury did not consider Romney's exhibit 57, 
in Ferrin's own handwriting, which provided that in the event 
Ferrin purchased KRA, Romney would be compensated for his efforts 
"by receiving 20% of the income [not "earnings"] to KRA net of 
[business cultivation] expenses . . ." Moreover, and more 
importantly, "[i]f [Romney] leaves KRA on his own or is terminated 
the above mentioned 20% payments shall cease." Imagine it. 
Ferrin's contention at trial was that his entitlement to 
compensation did not "cease" when he quit KRA. His "fairness" 
arguments would have been placed in an entirely different light by 
this document. If the tables were turned and Ferrin were the 
employer, Ferrin was himself totally unwilling to agree to what he 
so effectively argued to jury Romney impliedly "agreed" to, that 
it just made sense, as a matter of simple "fairness" and equity, 
that Ferrin should still be paid even after he quit KRA. This 
document shows that there is nothing "fair" about that if a party 
has not agreed to it. Again, Romney did not draft this document, 
Ferrin did. These are his words -- on the very subject matter of 
the lawsuit! Yet they would have totally contradicted Ferrin's own 
testimony at trial and supported and proved Romney's testimony. 
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Instead, all the jury could see or hear was Romney1 s stubborn, 
and apparent self-interest and "greed" in not wanting to pay Ferrin 
any part of the KRA income received after Ferrin quit and went to 
work for a prospective KRA client. Little wonder. Romney never 
agreed to pay Ferrin that money, nor would he have agreed to do so, 
and these two documents absolutely would have borne him out on 
that. . . The jury was simply not provided with all of the 
relevant evidence. As a result, the outcome of the trial was 
clearly affected, and this Court's confidence in the verdict should 
be undermined to such an extent that it should grant Romney a new 
trial where this key evidence will be considered by a jury. 
V. 
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN THE 
TAXING OF COSTS AGAINST ROMNEY 
The trial court abused its discretion in taxing costs against 
Romney because the witness travel expenses the court taxed as 
"costs" are not authorized by statute. In his brief, Ferrin 
contends, in effect, that a trial court has the "discretion" to tax 
witness travel expenses as "costs" even if such costs are not 
authorized by statute. In so arguing, Ferrin quotes from Morgan 
v. Morgan, 795 P.2d 684, 686 (Utah Ct. App. 1990), in which the 
Court states that costs are "generally allowable only in the 
amounts and in the manner provided by statute," but that a trial 
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court can "exercise reasonable discretion in regard to the 
allowance of costs." Morgan, supra, at p. 686. 
Ferrin has misread Morgan. While a trial court may have 
"discretion," there are limits to such discretion, and the limits 
are set out in the statutes and the cases. Indeed, the Morgan 
Court itself went on to state that "witness fees, travel expenses, 
and service of process expenses are chargeable only in accordance 
with the fee schedule set by statute." Morgan, supra, at pp. 686-
687 (emphasis added). 
The applicable statute, Utah Code Ann. 21-5-4(2) permits the 
taxing of travel expenses at the rate of 25 cents per mile 
"traveled inside the state in going only." The witness travel 
expenses taxed as "costs" in this case (airfare, lodging, taxi, 
transportation, and food), however necessary or helpful to Ferrinfs 
case, are simply not authorized by statute. Consequently, under 
the guidelines set forth by this Court and the Utah Supreme Court, 
the trial court abused its discretion in taxing costs against 
Romney. 
CONCLUSION 
At the conclusion of Ferrin's brief, almost as an aside, 
Ferrin makes the assertion that: 
"the trial court did allow [Romney] to ask the witness, 
for impeachment purposes, whether his understanding of 
compensation was consistent with the language found in the 
Exhibits. (R.1188.) [Romney] did not choose to follow the 
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Court's ruling in that regard. Accordingly, [Romney] should 
not be allowed to complain, now, that he was prejudiced in 
some manner. 
This is a classic "red herring." It is an objection of form over 
substance. In making his appeal, Romney challenges the trial 
court's ruling, in the first instance, in finding these two 
documents not to be relevant. Romney also happens to believe that 
the trial court acted improperly when it later foreclosed counsel 
from effectively using these documents even for the limited purpose 
of impeachment. But the basis of this appeal is the trial court's 
relevancy determination. 
It is true that the trial court initially ruled as Ferrin 
indicates. Transcript, Day 2, pp. 84 and 89. However, it is false 
that Romney "did not choose to follow the Court's ruling in that 
regard." Even to the minimal extent allowed by the court, Romney 
attempted to use these documents for impeachment, but was prevented 
from doing so in any meaningful way. As the transcript quite 
clearly shows, Romney attempted to do so but was stopped in his 
tracks by the court who, without any further discussion or allowing 
any further questions, or even a side bar, reiterated her position 
that the documents were irrelevant and sustained counsel's 
premature objections. Transcript, Day 2, pp. 103-105. Romney was 
prevented from laying even the most minimal foundation for these 
documents for impeachment purposes. He was prevented from putting 
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them in any sort of context at all for the jury. This means that 
the documents would have had no meaning to the jury and thus would 
have been robbed of their importance and value, even for 
impeachment purposes. 
The point is, Romney!s Exhibit 57 and 58 were clearly 
"relevant" in the first instance because they each had a "tendency 
to make the existence of [a] fact that is of consequence to the 
determination of the action more probable or less probable than it 
would be without the evidence." Moreover, the trial court's error 
in excluding the evidence was prejudicial because there is "a 
reasonable likelihood the error affected the outcome of the 
proceedings." Finally, the trial court abused its discretion in 
awarding Ferrin's witness travel expenses as "costs" because the 
"travel expenses" claimed are not authorized to be taxed as costs 
by statute or under current Utah case law. 
For all of the foregoing reasons, Romney respectfully requests 
that the Court reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand 
this case for a new trial. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this ( / day of November, 1993. 
David L. Blackner 
Attorney for Appellant 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this 1 1 day of November, 1993, I 
caused two true and correct copies of the foregoing REPLY BRIEF OF 
THE APPELLANT to be hand delivered to the following: 
Duane R. Smith 
Craig G. Adamson 
DART, ADAMSON & KASTING 
310 South Main Street, Suite 1330 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
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